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Abstract
Set functions are widely used in many domains of Operations Research (cooperative
game theory, decision under risk and uncertainty, combinatorial optimization) under dif-
ferent names (TU-game, capacity, nonadditive measure, pseudo-Boolean function, etc.).
Remarkable families of set functions form polyhedra, e.g., the polytope of capacities, the
polytope of p-additive capacities, the cone of supermodular games, etc. Also, the core of a
set function, defined as the set of additive set functions dominating that set function, is a
polyhedron which is of fundamental importance in game theory, decicion making and com-
binatorial optimization. This survey paper gives an overview of these notions and studies
all these polyhedra.
Keywords: TU-game, capacity, nonadditive measure, pseudo-Boolean function, Mo¨bius trans-
form, supermodular game, p-additive game, multichoice game, core.
1 Introduction
Set functions, that is, functions assigning a real number to any subset of a universal set, are
encountered in many domains of Operations Research and discrete mathematics, often under
different names. Let us give some examples. In (cooperative) game theory, the characteristic
function of a game with transferable utility is a set function vanishing on the empty set. They
are often abbreviated as TU-games, or simply games. In decision under risk or uncertainty,
recent nonadditive models use generalizations of probability measures which are called capac-
ities (Choquet [6]), or nonadditive measures (Denneberg [9]), fuzzy measures (Sugeno [50]),
monotone measures, etc. These are set functions vanishing on the empty set (hence games) and
monotone w.r.t. set inclusion. Pseudo-Boolean functions, introduced by Hammer and Rudeanu
[32], are real-valued mappings whose domain is the set of Boolean vectors, and are therefore
equivalent to set functions. They have many applications in computer sciences, graph theory,
data mining, etc. (see, e.g., Crama and Hammer [7, Ch. 13], and O’Donnell [41]). In combina-
torial optimization, submodular and monotone set functions are considered, since they appear
as the rank function of a matroid. They are studied at length in the monograph of Fujishige
[18].
Many of the above cited domains are related to optimization problems, linear programming
and polyhedra. One of the reasons is that remarkable families of set functions are defined by
linear inequalities, and therefore form polyhedra. This is the case for capacities (monotone
normalized set functions), supermodular games, or p-additive games, defined through their
Mo¨bius transform. Another reason is that the core of a set function is a fundamental concept
in most of the above cited domains. It is the set of additive set functions dominating a given
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set function, and is therefore a polyhedron. In game theory, it is one of the most popular
solution concept. In decision theory, it gives the set of compatible probability measures. In
combinatorial optimization, it is known as the base polyhedron associated to a polymatroid.
The aim of the paper is to make a survey of these aspects, summarizing most relevant
classical results, showing recent ones, and exploring some generalizations like games with re-
stricted domain, multichoice games, the k-additive core, etc. It also aims at enhancing the close
connections between cooperative game theory, combinatorial optimization, decision theory and
Operations Research in general. Indeed, as it will be seen, many results have been proved at
the same time in different domains. Many other aspects of set functions, games and capacities
can be found in the monograph of the author [24].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the necessary background on games,
capacities, pseudo-Boolean functions, posets and lattices, the Mo¨bius transform, multichoice
games and k-ary capacities. Sections 3 to 6 study the polyhedra formed by various families
of set functions (capacities, p-additive capacities, k-ary capacities, and supermodular games).
The core of games is studied in detail in Section 7, for classical games and for games with a
restricted domain. Finally, the k-additive core is studied in Section 8.
2 Background
Throughout the paper, we consider a finite set N with |N | = n. We often omit braces for
singletons and sets, as far as no ambiguity menaces, writing, e.g., S ∪ i instead of S ∪ {i}, 12
instead of {1, 2}, etc.
Basic definitions: set functions, games and capacities. A set function on N is a map-
ping ξ : 2N → R assigning to every subset S ⊆ N a real number. A game on N is a set function
v vanishing on the empty set: v(∅) = 0. We say that a game is monotone if S ⊆ T ⊆ N implies
v(S) ≤ v(T ), and normalized if v(N) = 1. In decision theory, a monotone normalized game is
called a capacity1 (Choquet [6]), which we denote by µ.2 A 0-1-capacity (a.k.a. simple game)
is a capacity taking value on {0, 1}. A zero-normalized game v is a game such that v({i}) = 0
for every i ∈ N . We denote the set of capacities on N by C(N), and the set of games on N by
G(N).
The conjugate of a game v is a game v defined by
v(S) = v(N)− v(N \ S) (S ∈ 2N ).
A game is said to be:
(i) additive if for every disjoint S, T in 2N , we have
v(S ∪ T ) = v(S) + v(T );
(ii) supermodular if for every S, T ∈ 2N , we have
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ); (1)
(iii) submodular if the reverse inequality holds.
1In general, normalization is not required. We assume it throughout this paper for convenience.
2As far as possible, we stick to these notations: ξ for set functions, v for games and µ for capacities.
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Instances in Operations Research. In cooperative game theory, N represents the set
of players, and the function v (whose exact name is characteristic function of a game with
transferable utility) gives for each coalition S ⊆ N of players its worth v(S), defined as the
maximal benefit or cost saving achievable by cooperation of the members of S.
In decision theory, N is typically the set of states of nature, subsets of N are called events,
and µ(S) quantifies the uncertainty pertaining to the realization of S.
Particular set functions arise also in combinatorial optimization and Operations Research.
In combinatorial optimization, a pair (N, ρ) where ρ is a submodular capacity, is called a
polymatroid (see, e.g., Fujishige [18]). This refers to the rank function of a matroid, which is
always submodular. In reliability theory, set functions model the structure of a multicomponent
system and permit to study its lifetime: given a n-component system and supposing that each
component can be in two states (0: failure, 1: functioning), the state of the whole system is
ruled by a function φ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. It is most often assumed that φ is nondecreasing in
each place, hence φ is nothing other than a 0-1-capacity (or simple game).
Pseudo-Boolean functions. Set functions can also be seen as pseudo-Boolean functions, a
widely developed area in Operations Research, after the seminal work of Hammer and Rudeanu
[32] (see Crama and Hammer [7, Ch. 13]). A pseudo-Boolean function is a function f : {0, 1}n →
R; they are equivalent to set functions through the isomorphism {0, 1}n ≡ 2N , where a set S is
represented by its characteristic function 1S :
f ↔ ξ f(1S)↔ ξ(S).
It is easy to check that any pseudo-Boolean function can be put under the form:
f(x) =
∑
T⊆N
f(1T )
∏
i∈T
xi
∏
i∈T c
(1− xi) (x ∈ {0, 1}n). (2)
Rearranging the terms so as to obtain a sum of monomials, we get:
f(x) =
∑
T⊆N
aT
∏
i∈T
xi (x ∈ {0, 1}n). (3)
The degree of a pseudo-Boolean function is the highest degree of the monomials in (3), where
the degree of the monomial
∏
i∈T xi is simply |T |.
Posets and lattices. A poset (partially ordered set) (P,) is a set P endowed with a partial
order  (reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive binary relation). If x ≺ y and there is no z
such that x ≺ z ≺ y, we write x ≺· y and say that x is a predecessor of y. For any two
elements x, y in a poset (P,) such that x  y, the interval [x, y] is defined by [x, y] = {z ∈
P | x  z  y}. A lattice (L,) is a poset satisfying the following property: for every x, y ∈ L,
their infimum (greatest lower bound) x ∧ y and supremum (least upper bound) x ∨ y exist. A
lattice is distributive if ∨,∧ obey distributivity, i.e., x∨ (y ∧ z) = (x∨ y)∧ (x∨ z) (equivalently,
x ∧ (y ∨ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z)).
In a lattice (L,), an element x ∈ L is said to be join-irreducible if it is not the least
element of L and it cannot be written as a supremum of other elements. In a finite lattice, this
is equivalent to say that x has only one predecessor. We denote by J (L,) or J (L) if  is
clear from the context the set of join-irreducible elements of L.
Q ⊆ P is a downset of a poset (P,) if x ∈ Q and y  x imply y ∈ Q. The set of all
downsets of a poset (P,) is denoted by O(P,) or simply O(P ). An important result of
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Birkhoff [4] says that a lattice (L,) is distributive if and only if it is isomorphic to the lattice
(O(J (L)),⊆).
A chain in a poset (P,) is a sequence x1, . . . , xq of distinct elements in P such that
x1 ≺ · · · ≺ xq. A chain is maximal if no supersequence is a chain. Two elements x, y ∈ (P,)
are incomparable if none of x  y or y  x holds. An antichain is a set of elements in P which
are pairwise incomparable.
We illustrate the previous notions and result with N = {1, . . . , n} the set of players. The set
2N endowed with ⊆ is a lattice, called a Boolean lattice. Any subcollection F of 2N can be seen
as a poset when endowed with ⊆. F can be a lattice, but in this case, infimum and supremum
are not necessarily intersection and union. For instance, take n = 3, F = {∅, 1, 2, 3, 123}. Then
1 ∨ 2 = 123 6= 1 ∪ 2. If (F ,⊆) is a distributive lattice, then Birkhoff’s result amounts to saying
that there exists a partial order  on N generating F , by taking all downsets of (N,) and
ordering them by inclusion. The converse being true as well, there is a bijection between partial
orders on N and collections F that are distributive lattices. It is to be noted that with this
construction, the supremum and infimum in F are union and intersection. This is illustrated
in Figure 1.
1
2
3
4
1 3
123
3413
134
1234
Figure 1: n = 4. Left: a poset (N,). Right: the set of downsets of (N,), ordered by
inclusion. It is a distributive lattice (F ,⊆). Its join-irreducible elements are in red, and the
poset of join-irreducible elements (J (F),⊆) is isomorphic to (N,)
The Mo¨bius transform. (Rota [44]) Let us consider a poset (P,), and suppose that it is
locally finite (i.e., all intervals [x, y] are finite), and has a least element 0. Consider the following
system of equations, where f is given:
f(x) =
∑
yx
g(y) (x ∈ P ). (4)
There is always a unique solution to (4), i.e., it is always possible to express g in terms of f .
Then g is called the Mo¨bius inverse of f , and is given by
g(x) =
∑
yx
µ(y, x)f(y) (5)
where µ, called the Mo¨bius function, is defined inductively by
µ(x, y) =


1, if x = y
−∑xt≺y µ(x, t), if x ≺ y
0, otherwise.
(6)
We apply this general theory to set functions, that is, the poset under consideration is
(2N ,⊆). We find that to any set function ξ on N we can associate its Mo¨bius inverse mξ :
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2N → R, unique solution of the linear system:
ξ(S) =
∑
T⊆S
mξ(T ) (S ∈ 2N ), (7)
and explicitely given by
mv(S) =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S\T |v(T ) (S ∈ 2N ). (8)
Considering the mapping ξ 7→ mξ on R2N as a transform over the set of set functions, we call
mξ the Mo¨bius transform of ξ. In game theory, the Mo¨bius transform of a game is known as
the Harsanyi dividends (Harsanyi [33]). Comparing (7) with (3), one can see that they are the
same up to the isomorphism f ↔ ξ, from which we conclude that the coefficients aT are nothing
other than the Mo¨bius transform of ξ (or f).
Unanimity games. Given ∅ 6= T ⊆ N , the unanimity game centered on T is a game defined
by:
uT (S) =
{
1, if S ⊇ T
0, otherwise.
It is well known that the set of unanimity games constitutes a basis of the (2n − 1)-dim vector
space of games. Adding the set function u∅ defined by u∅(S) = 1 for every S ∈ 2N , we get a
basis for the 2n-dim vector space of set functions. The expression of any set function in this
basis is therefore:
ξ =
∑
T⊆N
aTuT
which yields
ξ(S) =
∑
T⊆N
aTuT (S) =
∑
T⊆S
aT ,
from which it becomes obvious that the coordinates aT of a set function in this basis are simply
the Mo¨bius transform of ξ (see (7)).
p-additive games and capacities. A game (or a capacity) v on N is (at most) p-additive
(p ∈ {1, . . . , n}) if its Mo¨bius transform satisfies
mv(S) = 0 if |S| > p.
1-additive games are ordinary additive games. p-additive games correspond to pseudo-Boolean
functions whose polynomial representation is of degree at most p. Clearly, p-additive games
with p < n require less coefficients to be defined, precisely at most
κ(p) =
(
n
1
)
+
(
n
2
)
+ · · · +
(
n
p
)
.
The set of at most p-additive capacities is denoted by C≤p(N).
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Multichoice games and k-ary capacities. Identifying 2N with {0, 1}N and considering
any game v, the quantity v(S) can be rewritten as v(1S), replacing coalitions by profiles of
participation (0: do not participate, 1: participate). The idea of multichoice games (Hsiao
and Raghavan [34]) is to consider several levels of participation: 0, 1, . . . , k. Specifically, a
multichoice game or k-choice game is a mapping v : {0, 1, . . . , k}N → R such that v(0, . . . , 0) = 0,
which assigns to any participation profile z a number v(z). A multichoice game is monotone
if z ≤ z′ (coordinatewise) implies v(z) ≤ v(z′), and normalized if v(k, . . . , k) = 1. With
k = 1, classical games are recovered. Monotone normalized k-multichoice games are called k-
ary capacities (Grabisch and Labreuche [25]). The set of k-ary capacities is denoted by Ck(N).
The Mo¨bius transform mv of a multichoice game v can be obtained from the general formula
(4), which becomes in this case
v(z) =
∑
y≤z
mv(y) (z ∈ {0, . . . , k}N ).
The unique solution of this system is
mv(z) =
∑
y≤z : zi−yi≤1∀i∈N
(−1)
∑
i∈N (zi−yi)v(y) (z ∈ {0, . . . , k}N ).
Based on this definition, a multichoice game is (at most) p-additive if mv(z) = 0 for every profile
z whose support contains more than p elements, i.e., |supp(z)| > p, where
supp(z) = {i ∈ N | zi > 0}.
The set of at most p-additive k-ary capacities is denoted by C≤pk (N).
3 The polytope of capacities
The set C(N) of capacities (monotone normalized games) on N being defined by a set of linear
equalities, it is a convex closed polyhedron of dimension 2n − 2, which is bounded. Facets of
this polytope are the irredundant monotonicity conditions
µ(S ∪ i)− µ(S) ≤ 0 (i ∈ N,S ⊆ N \ i).
The extreme points (vertices) of this polytope have been determined by Stanley [48], and redis-
covered by Radojevic [42].
Theorem 1. The set of extreme points of C(N) is the set of 0-1-capacities (simple games).
As is well known, simple games are determined through their collection of winning coalitions.
A coalition S is winning for a simple game v if v(S) = 1. By monotonicity, it follows that a
simple game v is entirely determined by the collection of its minimal (in the sense of inclusion)
winning coalitions. By definition, if S, T are two minimal winning coalitions, S 6⊆ T and
T 6⊆ S hold, so that the collection of minimal winning coalitions forms an antichain in the
lattice (2N ,⊆). It is known that the number of antichains in 2N , or equivalently, the number
of monotonic Boolean functions of n variables is the Dedekind number M(n). It follows that
the number of vertices of the polytope of capacities on N is M(n) − 2 (because the antichain
{∅}, corresponding to the constant set function 1, and the empty antichain, corresponding to
the null set function, have to be removed).
There is no known closed-form formula for an exact computation of these numbers. Up to
now, only the nine first numbers are known.
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n M(n)
0 2
1 3
2 6
3 20
4 168
5 7581
6 7828354
7 2414682040998
8 56130437228687557907788
Table 1: The Dedekind numbers M(n) for 0 ≤ n ≤ 8
Observe that by Theorem 1, this polytope is inscribed into the unit hypercube {0, 1}2n−2,
and the main diagonal belongs to the polytope. It follows that the diameter of the polytope
of capacities is the length of the diagonal, i.e.,
√
2n − 2. An interesting question is: in which
hypercube is inscribed the set of capacities when they are expressed through the Mo¨bius trans-
form, i.e., in the basis of unanimity games? The exact bounds of the Mo¨bius transform of a
capacity have been investigated by Grabisch and Miranda [29]. The result is surprising: the
bounds grow exponentially fast with n.
Theorem 2. For any capacity µ, its Mo¨bius transform satisfies for any A ⊆ N , |A| > 1:
−
(|A| − 1
l′|A|
)
≤ mµ(A) ≤
(|A| − 1
l|A|
)
,
with
l|A| = 2
⌊ |A|
4
⌋
, l′|A| = 2
⌊ |A| − 1
4
⌋
+ 1 (9)
and for |A| = 1 < n:
0 ≤ mµ(A) ≤ 1,
and mµ(A) = 1 if |A| = n = 1. These upper and lower bounds are attained by the normalized
capacities µ∗A, µA∗, respectively:
µ∗A(B) =
{
1, if |A| − l|A| ≤ |B ∩A|
0, otherwise
µA∗(B) =
{
1, if |A| − l′|A| ≤ |B ∩A|
0, otherwise
for any B ⊆ N .
Table 2 below gives the first values of the bounds.
Using the Stirling’s approximation
(2n
n
) ≃ 4n√
πn
for n → ∞, we obtain the asymptotic
behavior of the bounds:
− 4
n
2√
πn
2
≤ mµ(N) ≤ 4
n
2√
πn
2
. (10)
The theorem directly gives the coordinates of the vertices of the (2n − 2)-dim smallest
rectangle inscribing the polytope of capacities. Finding its diameter is however more difficult.
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|A| 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
u.b. of mµ(A) 1 1 1 3 6 10 15
l.b. of mµ(A) 1(0) −1 −2 −3 −4 −10 −20
|A| 8 9 10 11 12
u.b. of mµ(A) 35 70 126 210 462
l.b. of mµ(A) −35 −56 −126 −252 −462
Table 2: Lower and upper bounds for the Mo¨bius transform of a capacity
Observe that the capacities µ∗N , µN∗ are such that their value is 1 on the first lines of the
Boolean lattice 2N , and 0 otherwise. Table 3 (from which Table 2 is obtained) gives the values
of mµ(N) for all capacities µ on N such that their value on the first k + 1 lines is 1, and 0
otherwise. Considering an entry (n, k) of the table, which gives the value of mµ(N), observe
n/k 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
n = 1 1
n = 2 1 −1
n = 3 1 −2 1
n = 4 1 −3 3 −1
n = 5 1 −4 6 −4 1
n = 6 1 −5 10 −10 5 −1
n = 7 1 −6 15 −20 15 −6 1
n = 8 1 −7 21 −35 35 −21 7 −1
n = 9 1 −8 28 −56 70 −56 28 −8 1
n = 10 1 −9 36 −84 126 −126 84 −36 9 −1
n = 11 1 −10 45 −120 210 −252 210 −120 45 −10 1
n = 12 1 −11 55 −105 330 −462 462 −330 165 −55 11 −1
Table 3: Computation of the upper (red) and lower (blue) bounds of mµ(N). The value of the
capacity µ is 1 for the k + 1 first lines of the lattice 2N . Each entry (n, k) equals mµ(N)
that the value of mµ(N \ i) for any i ∈ N is given by the entry (n− 1, k − 1), and so forth: the
successive values of mµ lie on the diagonal (n, k), (n− 1, k− 1), (n− 2, k− 2), . . .. Observe that
for n ≤ 5, choosing k which yields the upper bound or the lower bound gives a diagonal passing
only through upper or lower bounds. This guarantees that the coordinates of the corresponding
capacities in the basis of unanimity games are maximal, which permits to find the diameter.
Taking for example n = 5, k = 2 yields the upper bound (µ∗N ) and k = 3 yields the lower bound
(µN∗). The coordinates of these capacities are:
A |A| = 1 |A| = 2 |A| = 3 |A| = 4 |A| = 5
mµ
∗
N (A) 0 0 1 -3 6
mµN∗(A) 0 1 -2 3 -4
Therefore the Euclidean distance between them is (discarding the coordinates for ∅ and N since
the dimension is 2n − 2)
d(mµ
∗
N ,mµN∗) =
√(
5
2
)
· 1 +
(
5
3
)
· 32 +
(
5
4
)
· 62 =
√
280.
This is the diameter for n = 5 (compare with the diameter in original coordinates
√
30). For
higher values of n, we conjecture that the same method also yields the diameter.
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4 The polytope of p-additive capacities
The set of p-additive capacities is a subpolytope of the polytope of capacities, because the
additional restrictions are linear inequalities. For p = 1, we obtain the polytope of additive
capacities, i.e., probability measures. It is easily found that the set of extreme points of this
polytope is the set of unanimity games centered on singletons, u{i}, i ∈ N . Remark that these
are exactly the additive 0-1-capacities.
For p = 2, the same type of result holds: the vertices of the polytope of 2-additive capacities
are simply those vertices of the polytope of capacities which are 2-additive.
Theorem 3. (Miranda et al. [37, Prop. 11]) The set C≤2(N) of 2-additive capacities is a
(κ(2)−1)-dimensional polytope, whose extreme points are all at most 2-additive 0-1-capacities.
These 0-1-capacities are of three different types:
(i) The unanimity games u{i}, i ∈ N (these are the extreme points of C1(N));
(ii) The unanimity games u{i,j}, {i, j} ⊆ N ;
(iii) The conjugate of the unanimity games u{i,j}, {i, j} ⊆ N , given by
u{i,j,} = ui + uj − u{i,j}.
Moreover, the convex decomposition of any µ ∈ C≤2(N) is
µ =
∑
{i,j}⊆N :mµ(ij)<0
(−mµ(ij))u{i,j} +
∑
{i,j}⊆N :mµ(ij)>0
mµ(ij)u{i,j}
+
∑
i∈N
(
mµ(i) +
∑
j∈N\i :mµ(ij)<0
mµ(ij)
)
u{i}, (11)
with the shorthand ij standing for {i, j}.
The above result permits to know the number of extreme points of C≤2(N). Summing the
cardinality of all three types of extreme points, we find |N |+
(|N |
2
)
+
(|N |
2
)
= |N |2.
So far, no general result is known for p > 2. The study becomes very complex in this case
because there are extreme points which are not 0-1-valued (Miranda et al. [37]).
5 The polytopes of k-ary capacities and 2-additive k-ary capac-
ities
These polytopes have been studied by Grabisch and Labreuche [26]. We denote by L =
{0, 1, . . . , k} the set of participation levels.
By using a similar proof as in Theorem 1, the following is easy to show.
Theorem 4. The set of extreme points of Ck(N), the polytope of k-ary capacities, is the set
of 0-1-valued k-ary capacities.
However, unlike the classical case, the following result is more difficult to obtain.
Theorem 5. Let k ∈ N. The set of extreme points of C≤2k (N), the polytope of 2-additive k-ary
capacities, is the set of 0-1-valued 2-additive k-ary capacities.
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Let us define the support of v by:
supp(v) =
⋃
x∈LN :mv(x)6=0
supp(x),
which means that v depends only on the variables in supp(v).
Theorem 6. For every k ∈ N, the size of the support of any 0-1-valued 2-additive k-ary capacity
is at most 2.
Comparing with Theorem 3, we see that results that were true for classical 2-additive ca-
pacities still hold for k-ary capacities, for any k ∈ N: vertices are 0-1-valued, and the size of
their support is at most 2.
We give more insight in the extreme points of this polytope. By the above theorem, we
know that the size of the support of an extreme point is at most 2. If the size is 1, these vertices
are simply the unanimity games ux with x of the form (0, . . . , 0, ℓ, 0, . . . , 0), ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Now, take a vertex, i.e., a 0-1-valued capacity v ∈ C≤2k (N), with support of size 2, say {1, 2}.
By analogy with the classical case, a profile x ∈ LN is winning for a 0-1-valued v ∈ C≤2k (N)
if v(x) = 1, and it is minimal winning if there is no other winning profile y such that y ≤ x
coordinatewise. Therefore, minimal winning profiles are antichains in LN , and moreover, these
antichains are in L{1,2}. Denumbering vertices amounts therefore to denumbering the number
of antichains in L{i,j} for any i 6= j. This permits to count the total number of vertices of
C
≤2
k (N), which is: [(
2k + 2
k + 1
)
− 2
]
n(n− 1)
2
− kn(n− 2).
For a given antichain x1, . . . , xq in L{1,2}, supposing x11 ≤ · · · ≤ xq1, the Mo¨bius transform of the
corresponding extreme point is easy to obtain: put the value +1 for all elements x1, . . . , xq, −1
for all elements xℓ ∨ xℓ+1, ℓ = 1, . . . , q − 1 and 0 otherwise (see Figure 2).
0
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
x2 x1
1 1 1
−1 −1
Figure 2: Vertices of C≤2k (N) with k = 4. In red: an antichain in L
{1,2}; values in blue indicate
the Mo¨bius transform of the corresponding vertex
6 The cone of supermodular games
The set of supermodular games (as well as the set of submodular games) is a cone. A first
important result, established by Kuipers et al. [36], is about the set of irredundant inequalities
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defining this cone. Indeed, many inequalities are redundant if (1) is considered for all S, T ∈
2N . In terms of polyhedra, facets correspond to irredundant inequalities, and for the cone of
supermodular games, are given by:
v(S ∪ {i, j}) + v(S) ≥ v(S ∪ i) + v(S ∪ j)
for all distinct i, j ∈ N and all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
The cone of supermodular games is not pointed as it contains the set of additive games,
which form a linear space. We consider instead the cone of zero-normalized supermodular
games, which is pointed because the only zero-normalized additive game is the null game 0. Let
us denote the latter by G♦(N). The problem of finding the extremal rays of G♦(N) is difficult,
and was already considered by Shapley in 1971 [47]. He gave in this paper the 37 extremal
rays of G♦(N) with |N | = 4, but no indication for the general case. Later, Rosenmu¨ller and
Weidner [43] find all extremal rays of the cone of nonnegative supermodular games (it differs
from G♦(N) only by the addition of the extremal rays u{i}, i ∈ N) by representing each such
game as a maximum over shifted additive games:
v = max(φ1 − α1, . . . , φt − αt)
where φ1, . . . , φt are additive games and α1, . . . , αt ∈ R+. Up to some additional conditions,
the above representation can be put into a unique canonical form. For a given v and some
H ⊆ {1, . . . , t}, |H| ≥ 2, where t pertains to the canonical form, consider the collection SH of
sets such that v(S) = φi(S) − αi for every i ∈ H. Then v is an extremal ray if and only if
φ1, . . . , φt are the unique solution of the systems
φi(S)− αi = v(S) (i ∈ H,S ∈ SH)
for all H ⊆ {1, . . . , t}, |H| ≥ 2. We refer the readers to Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner [43] for the
details.
More recently, Studeny´ and Kroupa [49] proposed another criterion for finding the extremal
rays of G♦(N), based on the fact that supermodular games are exact and their core coincides
with the Weber set (see below for definitions).
7 The core of games
Given a game v on N , its core is defined by
core(v) = {x ∈ RN | x(S) ≥ v(S) ∀S ∈ 2N , x(N) = v(N)}
where we use the shorthand x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi, S ⊆ N (the notation suggests to consider x as an
additive game).
The core is an important concept which has been studied in depth, not only in cooperative
game theory where it was introduced by Gillies [20] and studied by Shapley [46, 47], but also
in decision theory and combinatorial optimization. In game theory, vectors x ∈ core(v) are
seen as payment vectors. v(N) is the total benefit or cost saving achieved by cooperation of all
players in N , which has to be shared among the players. Then xi represents the part of the
“cake” which is given to player i. The condition x(N) = v(N) means that the whole cake is
shared (this is called efficiency), while the condition x(S) ≥ v(S) means that the part given to
coalition S is at least as big as the amount of benefit that S could have realized by itself (this
is called coalitional rationality).
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In decision theory, capacities are considered instead, so that the core of a capacity µ is the set
of probability measures dominating µ (these are also called compatible probability measures).
The interpretation is the following: µ(A) quantifies the amount of certainty of some event
A ⊆ N . If not enough statistical information is available, µ is not a probability measure, but
represents a lower bound of it. Therefore it makes sense to search for all probability measures
which dominates µ. Now, the lower envelope of the core of µ does not necessarily give µ back.
If this is true, µ is said to be exact (Schmeidler [45]). The situation described in this paragraph
is a particular case of imprecise probabilities; see Walley [52].
In combinatorial optimization, where submodular games are considered, the dual notion of
core was introduced by Edmonds [14], namely the base polyhedron associated to a polymatroid
(N, ρ):
B(ρ) = {x ∈ RN+ | x(A) ≤ ρ(A)∀A ∈ 2N , x(N) = ρ(N)}.
It is easy to see that B(ρ) = core(ρ), the core of the conjugate game. Following Edmonds, the
properties of the base polyhedron were studied in depth by Fujishige and Tomizawa [19] (see a
summary in Fujishige [18, Sec. 3.3]).
7.1 The core of games on N
The core may be empty: it suffices for example that
∑
i∈N v({i}) > v(N) to make the core
empty. When nonempty, the core is a bounded closed convex polyhedron, whose dimension
is at most n − 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for nonemptiness has been found by
Bondareva [5] and Shapley independently [46]. This condition is based on the notion of balanced
collections, which are a generalization of partitions. A collection B of nonempty subsets in 2N
is balanced if there exist positive coefficients λS , S ∈ B, such that∑
S∈B,S∋i
λS = 1 (i ∈ N).
For example, taking N = {1, 2, 3}, B = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} with coefficients
(
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2
)
is a
balanced collection. Now, a game v is balanced if for any balanced collection with coefficients
λS , S ∈ B, it holds ∑
S∈B
λSv(S) ≤ v(N). (12)
Theorem 7. The core of a game v is nonempty if and only if v is balanced.
The foregoing theorem is usually referenced as the weak form of the Bondareva-Shapley
theorem. A sharp form is obtained by imposing inequality (12) only for minimal balanced
collections, i.e., those balanced collections which do not contain a proper balanced subcollection.
A complete description of the core is obtained through its extreme points in the case of
supermodular games. Let us consider the set of all permutations on N , denoted by S(N). To
any permutation σ ∈ S(N), we make correspond a chain in 2N :
∅ = S0 ⊂ S1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Sn = N
with
Si = {σ(1), . . . , σ(i)}.
Let v be a game. To each permutation σ ∈ S(N) we assign a marginal worth vector xσ,v in RN
defined by:
xσ,v
σ(i) := v(Si)− v(Si−1)
= v(Si−1 ∪ σ(i)) − v(Si−1) (i ∈ N).
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Observe that
xσ,v(Si) = v(Si) (i = 1, . . . , n). (13)
The convex hull of all marginal vectors is called the Weber set :
Web(v) = conv({xσ,v}σ∈S(N)).
The following inclusion always holds:
core(v) ⊆Web(v).
The reverse inclusion holds if and only if v is supermodular. More precisely, we have:
Theorem 8. The following are equivalent.
(i) v is supermodular;
(ii) All marginal vectors xσ,v, σ ∈ S(N), belong to the core;
(iii) core(v) = Web(v);
(iv) ext(core(v)) = {xσ,v}σ∈S(N).
Parts of this theorem have been shown several times. Up to the knowledge of the author,
the earliest version is due to Dempster in 1967 [8]. He proved that the marginal vectors are
extreme points of the core for capacities with a nonnegative Mo¨bius transform (usually called
belief functions). Shapley showed in 1971 [47] implications (i)⇒(ii) and (i)⇒(iv). At the same
time, Edmonds proved (i)⇒(iv) [14], and Ichiishi proved (ii)⇒(i) in 1981 [35].
Note that so far, no general result is known on the vertices of the core for games which
are not supermodular, except on the maximum number of vertices. Derks and Kuipers [12]
established that, as for supermodular games, the upper bound of the number of vertices is n!.
Partial results on vertices have been obtained by Nu´n˜ez and Rafels [39, 40], in particular for
almost convex games. A game v on N is almost convex if it satisfies the supermodularity con-
dition (1) for all S, T ⊂ N (in other words, every subgame vS for ∅ 6= S ⊂ N is supermodular).
Then, for those games, the set of extreme points of the core is given by
ext(core(v)) =
⋃
i∈N
((v(N) − v(N \ i))i, ext(core(vi))). (14)
We explain the notation. For any i ∈ N , the game vi is a game on N \ i defined by
vi(S) = max(v(S), v(S ∪ i)− (v(N)− v(N \ i))) (S ⊆ N \ i).
Now, ((v(N)−v(N \i))i, ext(core(vi))) is a n-dim vector whose ith component is v(N)−v(N \i),
and n−1 remaining components are just ext(core(vi)). Nu´n˜ez and Rafels show that if v is almost
convex, then vi too is almost convex, for any i ∈ N . Hence (14) permits to recursively compute
the extreme points of the core, coordinate by coordinate.
7.2 The core of games on set systems
When the domain of a game is restricted to some family F ⊂ 2N , the study of the core becomes
fairly more complicated. A survey on this topic has been done by the author in [23], to which
the reader is referred for details and other results. We give here the most fundamental results,
as well as new ones.
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A set system F is a subcollection of 2N containing N and ∅. We denote by (v,F) a game
on N whose domain is F (this is called a game with restricted cooperation (Faigle [15])). Many
examples of set systems have been studied (lattices, matroids, antimatroids, regular set systems,
etc., see, e.g., the monograph of Bilbao [1], or [2, 3]). We mainly focus in this section on set
systems which are distributive lattices, that is, of the form F = O(N) with N endowed with a
partial order . Games on such kind of set systems have been introduced by Faigle and Kern
[17] under the name game with precedence constraints.
The core of a game with restricted cooperation is defined as in the classical case:
core(v,F) = {x ∈ RN | x(S) ≥ v(S)∀S ∈ F , x(N) = v(N)}.
While the core is still a convex closed polyhedron of dimension at most n−1, unlike the classical
case, it may be unbounded, or even not pointed. We study its structure in the next paragraphs.
As a general fact, we know from the theory of polyhedra that the core is the Minkovsky sum
of its convex part (the convex hull of its vertices) and the conic part, called the recession cone
(conic combination of its extremal rays) and denoted by core(0,F), because it is given by
core(0,F) = {x ∈ RN | x(S) ≥ 0∀S ∈ F , x(N) = 0}.
Nonemptiness. The classical result of Bondareva-Shapley still holds when 2N is replaced by
F . However, something more can be said.
Theorem 9. (Grabisch and Sudho¨lter [30]) Let F = O(N,) be a distributive lattice. If
(N,) is connected, the core of any game on F is nonempty.
Here, “connected” means that the Hasse diagram of the poset, seen as a graph, is connected.
Pointedness. Supposing core(v,F) nonempty, it is pointed if and only if the system
x(S) = 0 (S ∈ F \ {∅})
has 0 as unique solution. In this case, we say that F is nondegenerate, otherwise it is degenerate.
Example 1. Consider n = 3 and F = {∅, 1, 2, 123}. The recession cone core(0,F) reads
x1 ≥ 0
x2 ≥ 0
x1 + x2 + x3 = 0.
The core, if nonempty, is pointed because putting equality everywhere leads to a system whose
unique solution is 0. Now, the core is not bounded because the vector (1, 0,−1) belongs to
core(0,F).
There are some obvious sufficient conditions for F to be nondegenerate or degenerate. For
example, if {i} ∈ F for every i ∈ N , or if F contains a maximal chain of length n, then F is
nondegenerate; it is degenerate if there exists a macro-player, that is, a subset K ⊂ N of at
least two elements such that for any S ∈ F , either S ⊇ K or S∩K = ∅. In case of a set system
closed under intersection, this turns out to be a sufficient and necessary condition (Faigle et al.
[16]).
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Boundedness The core is bounded if and only if the conic part is reduced to the zero vector:
core(0,F) = {0}. The following result, shown by Derks and Reijnierse [13], gives a necessary
and sufficient condition for boundedness.
Theorem 10. Let v be a balanced game on a set system F . Then core(v,F) is bounded if and
only if F is nondegenerate and F \ {∅, N} is balanced.
As we will see in the next paragraph, when F = O(N), the core is unbounded unless (N,)
is an antichain
Extremal rays of the core. Recall that in a poset (N,), i ≺· j means i ≺ j and there is
no k such that i ≺ k ≺ j. The extremal rays of the core when F = O(N) have been found by
Fujishige and Tomizawa [19], and rediscovered by Derks and Gilles [10].
Theorem 11. Let F = O(N,) be a set system. The conic part of the core reads
core(0,F) = cone(1{j} − 1{i} | i, j ∈ N such that j ≺· i).
The above result says that there is exactly one extremal ray per link in the Hasse diagram
of the poset (N,). Consequently, under the assumption that F = O(N), the only case where
the core is bounded is when (N,) is an antichain, i.e., F = 2N .
Example 2. Consider n = 4 and the poset (N,) given on Figure 1. Then there are three
extremal rays: (0, 0, 1,−1), (1,−1, 0, 0) and (0,−1, 1, 0).
The above result has been recently extended by Faigle et al. [16] for set systems which are
closed under intersection.
Theorem 12. Let (N,) be a poset, and consider a set system F ⊆ O(N,) which is closed
under intersection. Then 1{i} − 1{j} is a ray of core(0,F) for every i ≺· j in the poset (N,),
but not necessarily extremal. Moreover, core(0,F) = core(0,O(N,)) if and only if any S ∈
O(N,) \ F can be written as a union of disjoint sets in F .
Example 3. Consider n = 5 and F ⊂ O(N) depicted on Figure 3 together with (N,).
Observe that F \O(N) = {1234}, and that it is not possible to write 1234 as a union of disjoint
1
2
3
4
5
∅
1 3
13 34
123 134
1235
12345
Figure 3: Left: a poset (N,). Right: a set system F ⊂ O(N). Join-irreducible elements are
in red. O(N) \ F = {1234}
sets. Hence core(0,F) 6= core(0,O(N)). This can be verified as r = (0, 0, 1,−1, 0), which is
extremal in core(0,O(N)), is no more an extremal ray of core(0,F).
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Extreme points of the core. We give now the generalized version of Theorem 8, valid for
set systems of the form F = O(N,). Since these set systems are closed under union and
intersection, the definition of supermodularity is still valid.
A permutation σ ∈ S(N) is compatible with F if the corresponding maximal chain lies in
F . We denote by S(F) the set of permutations compatible with F .
Theorem 13. Let v be a game on (N,F) with F = O(N,). The following propositions are
equivalent.
(i) v is supermodular;
(ii) xσ,v ∈ core(v,F) for all σ ∈ S(F);
(iii) core(v,F) = conv({xσ,v | σ ∈ S(F)}) + core(0,F);
(iv) ext(core(v,F)) = {xσ,v | σ ∈ S(F)}.
As in the classical case, this result has been shown both in combinatorial optimization, by
Fujishige and Tomizawa [19], and in game theory, by Derks and Gilles [10].
Bounded faces of the core. We consider in this section the case where F is of the form
O(N,). The core being unbounded unless (N,) is an antichain, it is important to search
for remarkable bounded subsets, for example bounded faces. These are obtained through the
notion of normal collection (Grabisch [22]). It is well known from the theory of polyhedra that
faces of a polyhedron defined by a system of inequalities are obtained by turning some of the
inequalities into equalities. Since in the case of the core, inequalities correspond to subsets of
N , a normal collection is a collection of sets whose corresponding face is bounded. Formally, a
normal collection is any collection N ⊂ F \ {∅, N} of sets such that
coreN (0,F) = {x ∈ RN | x(S) ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ F , x(S) = 0 ∀S ∈ N , and x(N) = 0} = {0}.
Note that by convention, N 6∈ N . If core(v,F) 6= ∅, coreN (v) is a bounded face of the core.
It may be empty even if core(v,F) is nonempty. The union of all bounded faces of core(v,F)
is called the bounded core (Grabisch and Sudho¨lter [30]), and denoted by coreb(v,F). It is
equivalently defined by
coreb(v,F) = {x ∈ core(v,F) | ∀j ≺· i,∀ǫ > 0, x+ ǫ(1{i} − 1{j}) 6∈ core(v,F)}
and was axiomatized as a solution concept in [30].
We give a very simple criterion to find normal collections. We say that an extremal ray r of
core(0,F) is deleted by equality x(S) = 0, S ∈ F , if core{S}(0,F) = {x ∈ core(0,F) | x(S) = 0}
does not contain r any more.
Lemma 1. Let F = O(N). For i, j ∈ N such that j ≺· i, the extremal ray 1{j}−1{i} is deleted
by equality x(S) = 0 if and only if S ∋ j and S 6∋ i.
Example 4. (Ex. 3 continued) The three extremal rays can be deleted simply by the subset
{1, 3}. HenceN = {{1, 3}} is a normal collection, butN = {{1}, {3}} andN = {{1}, {3}, {1, 3}}
are normal collections as well.
The above simple example shows that in general there are many normal collections, inducing
faces of various dimensions. Obviously, the most interesting ones are those of largest dimension,
i.e., those defined by the smallest normal collections (in cardinality). It is proved in (Grabisch
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[22]) that a normal collection contains at least h(N) subsets, where h(N) is the height of (N,),
i.e., the length of a longest maximal chain. Observe that in Example 4, h(N) = 1. It is useful
to introduce the following properties of normal collections. Consider (N,) with h(N) > 0,
and a normal collection N = {N1, . . . , Nq}.
(i) N is a minimal collection if no proper subcollection is normal.
(ii) N is a nested collection if it is a chain in F .
It turns out that for supermodular games, minimal nested normal collections are sufficient to
generate all bounded faces of maximal dimension. We denote byMNNC(F) the set of minimal
nested normal collections of F .
Theorem 14. (Grabisch and Sudho¨lter [31])
(i) For any supermodular game v and any nested normal collection N of F , coreN (v,F) 6= ∅.
Moreover, if v is strictly supermodular, then dim coreN (v,F) = n− |N | − 1.
(ii) For any supermodular game v,
coreb(v,F) =
⋃
N∈MNNC(F)
coreN (v,F)
Moreover, no term in the union is redundant if v is strictly supermodular.
(iii) Let N be a normal collection of F . If v is strictly supermodular, then coreN (v,F) 6= ∅ if
and only if N is nested.
8 The k-additive core of games
Through the concept of k-additive games, there is a natural generalization of the core. Indeed,
using the identity between a vector x ∈ RN and an additive game on N , the core of a game
v can be defined as the set of additive games φ such that φ ≥ v pointwise and φ(N) = v(N).
Since additive games are 1-additive games, it is natural to introduce the k-additive core as the
set of (at most) k-additive games dominating a game v and coinciding on N :
corek(v) = {φ ∈ G≤k(N) | φ(S) ≥ v(S),∀S ∈ 2N , φ(N) = v(N)}.
The k-additive core has been proposed by Vassil’ev [51] and rediscovered later by Grabisch
and Miranda [28, 38]. The main advantage of the k-additive core is that, contrarily to the core,
it is never empty as soon as k ≥ 2. However, it is unbounded.
Theorem 15. (Miranda and Grabich [38]) The k-additive core is a convex polyhedron, nonempty
for every game as soon as k ≥ 2.
Theorem 16. (Gonzalez and Grabisch [21]) For all k ≥ 2, the k-additive core is unbounded
and pointed. Moreover, for k = 2, its extremal rays are of the form 1i − 1ij , for all i 6= j ∈ N .
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8.1 The k-additive core as a solution concept in cooperative game theory
Though its interpretation in cooperative game theory is not immediately clear, it can still be
explained in terms of payoff vectors, thus giving a new concept of solution of a game. Indeed,
any φ ∈ corek(v) can be written as, using (7) and recalling that φ is k-additive:
φ(S) =
∑
T⊆S
|T |≤k
mφ(T ) (S ∈ 2N ).
Now, mφ can be interpreted as a general payoff vector, in the sense that a payoff is given not
only to individuals, but also to coalitions, up to size k. Payments may be negative, but the
total sum allocated to a coalition S is always at least as large as v(S). If a payment only to
individuals is eventually required, then a second step is necessary, consisting in sharing the
payment given to coalitions among their individuals. This can be done by different means, e.g.,
sharing functions, bargaining, or when the payment is negative, by using rules for bankruptcy
problems. Let us focus only on sharing functions.
A sharing function is a mapping q : 2N \ {∅} ×N → [0, 1] satisfying
q(K, i) = 0 if i 6∈ K,
∑
i∈K
q(K, i) = 1, ∅ 6= K ⊆ N.
We denote by Q(N) the set of all sharing functions. Given φ ∈ corek(v) and a sharing function
q, xq(φ) ∈ RN is an efficient payoff vector defined by
xqi (φ) =
∑
S∋i
q(S, i)mφ(S) (i ∈ N).
Now, the set of all such payoff vectors, considering all possible sharing functions, is the selectope
of φ (Derks, Haller and Peters [11]):
sel(φ) = {xq(φ) | q ∈ Q(N)}.
A surprising result shown by Grabisch and Li [27] is the following: if the sharing function gives,
for every K, a nonnull portion of mφ(K) to every i ∈ K, then the selectope of φ is the set of
all efficient payoff vectors. Formally:
Theorem 17. Let 2 ≤ k ≤ n. For any q ∈ Q(N) such that q(K, i) > 0 for all ∅ 6= K ⊆ N and
i ∈ K, for any game v, we have
{xq(φ) | φ ∈ corek(v)} = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N)}.
This result shows that the k-additive core is a very large set, and some selection has to be
made in it. This problem has been addressed by Gonzalez and Grabisch [21]. They propose to
take those elements in corek(v) which minimize the total amount of payment to non-singleton
coalitions.
8.2 Vertices of the k-additive core
A result similar to Theorem 8 has been obtained for the k-additive core, giving extreme points
of it for a certain class of games. However, the study of the extreme points is much more
complex than for the classical case, and not all vertices are known so far. We present below the
machinery to find some of them, details can be found in (Grabisch and Miranda [28]).
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We begin by introducing some notation and new notions. We denote by Pk(N) the collection
of subsets of N containing at most k elements, and we use also Pk∗ (N) = Pk(N) \ {∅}. Given
ℓ ≥ 2, a game v is said to be ℓ-monotone if for any family A1, . . . , Aℓ of sets in 2N , it holds:
v(
ℓ⋃
i=1
Ai) ≥
∑
K⊆{1,...,ℓ}
K 6=∅
(−1)|K|+1v(
⋂
j∈K
Aj).
Observe that 2-monotonicity is nothing but supermodularity. A game is totally monotone if it
is ℓ-monotone for every ℓ ≥ 2. Totally monotone capacities are called belief functions. It is well
known that v is totally monotone if and only if mv(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N , |S| > 1.
We consider the subset of the k-additive core formed by all core elements which are totally
monotone:
corek∞(v) = {φ ∈ corek(v) | mφ(S) ≥ 0,∀S ∈ 2N , |S| > 1}.
In order to find vertices, the main idea is to find a substitute of marginal vectors, hence of
permutations on N . Since now the payment is done to every coalition of size at most k instead
to individuals, permutations ahould be defined on Pk∗ (N) instead of N . Let us then consider
a given total order ≺ on Pk∗ (N). For any B ∈ Pk∗ (N), we define the achievable family of B
induced by ≺ by
A(B) := {A ⊆ N | A ⊇ B,∀K ⊆ A,K ∈ Pk∗ (N),K  B}.
Example 5. Let us take n = 3, k = 2, and the total order 1 ≺ 2 ≺ 12 ≺ 13 ≺ 23 ≺ 3 on
P2∗ (N). The achievable families are given on Figure 4 in red. Observe that A({3}) is a Boolean
lattice, and that A(13) = ∅.
1 2 12 13 23 3
1 2 12
3
13 23
123
Figure 4: A total order (in blue) on P2∗ (N) with n = 3 and the induced achievable families (in
red)
It is easy to see that if |B| = 1, then A(B) 6= ∅ because B ∈ A(B) in this case. Also,
{A(B)}B∈Pk
∗
(N) is a partition of P(N) \ {∅}.
We consider now orders with peculiar properties. A total order ≺ is said to be
(i) compatible if for all i, j ∈ N , i ≺ j implies S ∪ i ≺ S ∪ j, for any S ∈ Pk−1(N), i, j 6∈ S;
(ii) ⊆-compatible if A ⊆ B implies A ≺ B;
(iii) strongly compatible if it is compatible and ⊆-compatible;
(iv) weakly compatible if it is compatible but not ⊆-compatible.
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Observe that in Ex. 5, the order is compatible but not strongly compatible. It can be shown that
if ≺ is compatible, then A(B) is either empty or an interval [B, Bˇ], that is, a Boolean lattice.
Moreover, A(B) is nonempty for all B ∈ Pk∗ (N) if and only if ≺ is ⊆-compatible. It follows
that for strongly compatible orders, all achievable families are nonempty Boolean lattices.
Achievable families play the roˆle of maximal chains. As it can be easily checked, with k = 1,
total orders on singletons are permutations on N , and all these orders are strongly compatible.
Moreover, taking a permutation σ on N and considering the order σ(1) ≺ · · · ≺ σ(n), we get
A({σ(j)}) = [{σ(j)}, {σ(1), . . . , σ(j)}],
i.e., the top element of the lattice is {σ(1), . . . , σ(j)}. Then the collection of all top elements
gives the maximal chain associated to σ (see Example 6 below).
The next step is to define the counterpart of marginal vectors. Consider a game v on N ,
and a total order ≺ on Pk∗ (N). The game v≺ is defined through its Mo¨bius transform m≺ by
m≺(B) :=
{∑
A∈A(B)m(A), if A(B) 6= ∅
0, otherwise,
(15)
for all B ∈ Pk∗ (N), and m≺(∅) := 0.
Example 6. We consider n = 3, k = 1 and the order on singletons 2 ≺ 1 ≺ 3. The achievable
families as well as the corresponding maximal chain is given in Figure 5. Computing m≺ by
2 1 3
2 1
12
3
13 23
123
∅
123
1 2 3
12 13 23
Figure 5: Left: achievable families for the order 2 ≺ 1 ≺ 3. Right: corresponding maximal
chain in (2N ,⊆)
(15) yields:
m≺(2) = m(2) = v(2) = x
σ,v
2
m≺(1) = m(1) +m(12) = v(12) − v(2) = xσ,v1
m≺(3) = m(3) +m(13) +m(23) +m(123) = v(123) − v(12) = xσ,v3 ,
hence the marginal vector xσ,v is recovered.
Elementary properties of v≺ are:
(i) If ≺ is compatible and A(B) is nonempty, then v≺(Bˇ) = v(Bˇ);
(ii) If ≺ is compatible and v is k-monotone, then v≺ is infinitely monotone.
Observe that the first property is similar to (13). Recalling that supermodularity is 2-monotonicity,
the following result is a generalization of the Shapley-Ichiishi result.
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Theorem 18. A game v is (k + 1)-monotone if and only if for all compatible orders ≺, v≺ is
an element of the k-additive core. Moreover, when v is (k + 1)-monotone,
(i) If ≺ is strongly compatible, then v≺ is a vertex of corek(v);
(ii) If ≺ is compatible, then v≺ is a vertex of corek∞(v).
However, unlike the classical case k = 1, the above construction based on strongly compatible
orders is far from giving all vertices. In fact, the number of vertices obtained by this construction
is at most n!
k! (observe that with k = 1, we recover that the maximum number of vertices of the
core is n!). When k = n − 1, it is however possible to get all vertices, as shown in the next
theorem.
Theorem 19. Let v be any game in G(N), with Mo¨bius transform mv.
(i) If mv(N) > 0, coren−1(v) contains exactly 2n−1 (if n is even) or 2n−1 − 1 (if n is odd)
vertices, among which n vertices come from strongly compatible orders. They are given
by their Mo¨bius transform:
m∗B0(K) =
{
mv(K), if K 6⊇ B0
mv(K) + (−1)|K\B0|mv(N), else
for all B0 ⊂ N such that |N \B0| is odd.
(ii) If mv(N) = 0, then there is only one vertex, which is v itself.
(iii) If mv(N) < 0, coren−1(v) contains exactly 2n−1− 1 (if n is odd) or 2n−1 − 2 (if n is even)
vertices, of which none comes from a strongly compatible order. They are given by their
Mo¨bius transform:
m∗B0(K) =
{
mv(K), if K 6⊇ B0
mv(K)− (−1)|K\B0|mv(N), else
for all B0 ⊂ N such that |N \B0| is even.
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